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TRANSPORTATION CONTROLS:
TIME TO CLEAR THE AIR
I. Introduction
The Clean Air Act (Act)' was enacted "to protect and enhance the
quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health
and welfare and the productive capacity of its population."' 2 Amend-
ments under considertion by Congress may curtail the Act's effective-
ness in certain areas,3 necessitating the utilization of additional air
pollution control strategies, such as the use of transportation control
measures. Transportation controls reduce the high levels of air pollu-
tion caused by motor vehicles in urban environments.
4
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 1 1977 & Supp. I 1978 & Supp. III 1979).
2. Id. § 7401(b)(1). Several other purposes also are enumerated by the Act,
including the promotion of research and development programs in the area of air
pollution, provision of technical and financial assistance to the states for development
and implementation of air pollution control programs, and promotion of regional air
pollution control programs. Id. §§ 7401(b)(2)-(4).
3. Although there appear to be conflicting views regarding the actual substance of
proposed amendments to the Clean Air Act, a legislative draft released, by the
Environmental Protection Agency on September 4, 1981 seemed to recommend
elimination of specific programs for nonattainment areas, such as annual incremen-
tal emission reductions; elimination of programs to prevent significant deterioration
of clean air, such as removal of air quality monitoring from the program; mandated
use of cost-benefit analysis prior to establishment of any regulation or standard,
changing the definition of 'hazardous air pollutant' to incorporate cost consider-
ations; relaxation of requirements for automobile emissions, and permitting the
agency to exercise its discretion in penalizing noncompliers and mitigating penalties.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1981, at Al, col. 5. Earlier Reagan Administration proposals
had included an adjustment of the attainment deadline for primary standards from
1982 to perhaps 1987. N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1981, at All, col. 1. A document
originating in the House of Representatives also purported to advance the Adminis-
tration's position on the Clean Air Act, and its provisions were far more extensive
than were those of the EPA draft released in September. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM.
ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT, MEMORANDUM ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S DRAF-r
PROPOSAL FOR AMENDING THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as MEMORANDUM]. The House memorandum noted that the Administration
favored repeal of the nonattainment program, including elimination of sanctions for
failure to submit a satisfactory State Implementation Plan (SIP), elimination of the
requirement that EPA promulgate regulations for a state if the state fails to do so,
and elimination of the automobile inspection and maintenance program; establish-
ment of a presumptive validity for submitted SIP's; elimination of the program to
prevent deterioration of clean air except in national parks and wilderness areas;
repeal of secondary standards, see note 11 infra; relaxation of automobile emission
standards; and discretionary use of enforcement orders and penalties by the EPA. Id.
4. See note 18 infra for a discussion of transportation controls. See also COUNCIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT (1980), for a discussion of
air quality problems in various urban areas. The report based its findings on the
number of days per year in which the concentration of particular substances ex-
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This Note discusses the nature of transportation controls and trans-
portation control plans (TCP) adopted by New York and Texas. 5
These states have adopted very different systems of transportation
control with the resources available to them. The TCP promulgated
by New York relies heavily on traffic flow regulations and improve-
ment of mass transit facilities' to achieve its objectives, while the TCP
commitments included in the Texas state plan emphasize van and car
pool programs, as well as expanded park and ride facilities. 7 This
Note examines the litigation resulting from the implementation of the
New York and Texas transportation control measures. In addition, the
legal implications of parking restrictions, traffic flow regulations,
motor vehicle inspection and maintenance programs, and differential
toll rates are reviewed, along with the practical problems involved in
implementing van and car pool programs and toll strategies.
ceeded the standards set by the EPA in a given city. Any day on which the National
Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for a substance (such as ozone, carbon
monoxide, and sulfur dioxide) was violated was characterized as unhealthful, and the
aggregate number of such days was utilized as the measure of air pollution in the
various cities. Id. at 146. The report notes that high levels of ozone and carbon
monoxide were responsible for unhealthful air in the urban areas. In Los Angeles and
Philadelphia, for example, unhealthful air pollution levels were due to excessive
amounts of ozone, while in Chicago and Denver, violation of acceptable air quality
standards was due to carbon monoxide concentrations. Id. at 153. For a further
discussion of NAAQS, see note 11 injra.
5. In 1978 several major urban areas still were experiencing severe air pollution
problems. For example, air quality in New York and Los Angeles failed to achieve
nationally acceptable standards on 174 and 206 days, respectively. COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 146 (1980). In addition Hous-
ton's air pollution level exceeded national standards for 94 days in 1978. Although the
absolute number of days in violation of EPA standards was much lower in Houston
than in New York, Houston's statistic represented a threefold increase over its own
figure for 1974. Id.
6. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, AIR QUALITY IM-
PLEMENTATION PLAN (1979). Traffic flow measures involve road reconstruction, traf-
fic engineering improvements, and utilziation of new traffic management strategies.
Demonstration projects currently are underway on several major traffic arteries in
the New York City area to assess the effectiveness of improved traffic flow systems on
air pollution. Id. at V-74. The public transportation aspect of the SIP proposes to
implement improvement of the mass transit system by the use of more effective
management techiques; rehabilitation of the system's stations, equipment, and main-
tenance faciities, promotion of the system through public information, and fare
stabilization. 45 Fed. Reg. 43798 (1980).
7. See HOUSTON-GALVESTON AREA COUNCIL, FIRST ROUND OF COMMITMENTS ON
TRANSPORTATION CONTROL (1981) [hereinafter cited as HOUSTON-GALVESTON AREA
COUNCIL]. The Houston-Galveston Area Council is an intercity agency responsible
for transportation and air quality planning. One of its primary duties is to assist in
the development of the Texas SIP. The Council's first set of planning commitments
relies heavily on van pool and park and ride programs to implement air pollution
reductions in the Houston-Galveston area by 1987. See HOUSTON-GALVESTON AREA
COUNCIL at 1-3.
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II. The Statutory Framework
The Clean Air Act was passed in 1970 in the form of extensive
amendments to existing air pollution control legislation.8 The Act has
been amended twice since 1970, first by the 1974 amendments which
promote the increased use of coal' and second, by the 1977 amend-
ments which resolve certain practical and legal problems concerning
the implementation of the 1970 provisions.' 0
The Act utilizes a variety of methods for improving national air
quality, " including the requirement that states promulgate State Im-
8. In Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975), the Court recounted the history of clean
air legislation prior to 1970. As early as 1955, Congress had begun to promote the
study of air pollution. The first Clean Air Act was passed in 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-
206, 77 Stat. 392 (1953), but its provisions generally were limited to support of
research efforts and local air pollution control agencies. The Air Quality Act of 1967
Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967), increased federal supervision of local air
pollution activities, but largely retained the philosophy that primary responsibility
for pollution abatement remained with the states and their subdivisions. Train, 421
U.S. at 63-64.
9. Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (1974). At that time Congress mandated
conversion of major oil-and-gas-burning facilities to coal, and permitted a relaxation
of emission standards if needed to accomplish this objective. AMERICAN LAW DIVISION
OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, REPORT ON THE CLEAN AIR ACT IN THE
COURTS, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN
LAW DIVISION.].
10. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977). The 1977 amendments dealt, in part,
with nonattainment of ambient standards by statutory deadlines, see note 11 infra;
pollution from federal facilities; revision of acceptable auto emission levels; and
pollution limits in clean air areas. Id. at 3. Among the issues that remain unresolved
are certain aspects of the state-federal relationship, in particular the ability of the
EPA to compel a state to enact the legislation or regulations necessary for implemen-
tation of a particular program. This problem first arose in the mid-1970's but has yet
to be definitively resolved. For example, in District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d
971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the court invalidated EPA-promulgated transportation control
provisions requiring the District of Columbia to, among other things, establish a
motor vehicle inspection and maintenance program, retrofit vehicles with emission
control devices, and purchase new buses. The court also noted that the EPA Adminis-
trator was, in its opinion, not empowered to impose sanctions upon states for non-
implementation. This decision was later vacated in EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99
(1977), but the issue remained unresolved as the federal party already had renounced
its intention to pursue the disputed course of action. In a subsequent decision involv-
ing similar control measures, the District of Columbia Circuit Court reinstated its
earlier holding, invalidating the retrofit and bicycle lane provisions of the EPA-
promulgated regulations. District of Columbia v. Costle, 567 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
11. The EPA is authorized to formulate National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS). 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1). NAAQS establish both primary and secondary
standards for various substances. Primary standards involve protection of the public
health, id. § 7409(b)(1), while secondary standards involve protection of the public
welfare, id. § 7409(b)(2), e.g., "effects on soils, water, crops, . . . property, . . . as
well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and well-being," id. §
19821
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plementation Plans (SIP) 12 which enumerate and describe methods for
controlling air pollution. Each SIP must contain a TCP if necessary
7602(h). Opposition to EPA-promulgated NAAQS often has led to court action. In
Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d. 1130 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042
(1980), the plaintiffs sought review of the ambient air quality standards for lead. The
court found that the EPA need not consider economic or technological feasibility in
establishing the standards, since legislative intent indicates that the achievement of
healthful air quality was Congress' primary goal in enacting the legislation. Id. at
1148-49. If the EPA has not yet formulated a standard for a particular substance the
government can still seek enforcement of air quality control on its own property. See,
e.g., United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 478 F. Supp. 1215, 1218-19 (D. Mont.
1979) (suit by the United States in its common law capacity to enjoin flouride
emissions from polluting the air resources of Flathead National Forest and Glacier
National Park). 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 relate to deterioration in clean air areas. The
principal purpose of these sections is to promote the coordination of economic growth
with maintenance of existing clean air resources. Id. § 7470. National parks and
wilderness areas are enumerated specifically as areas to be protected from air quality
deterioration. Id. § 7472. The method employed to prevent deterioration of clean air
areas is the establishment of baseline concentrations for each pollutant and of maxi-
mum allowable increases for each substance. Id. § 7473. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 sets
standards of performance, such as permissible emission limitations, for any stationary
source (e.g., a factory), the construction or modification of which began after the
publication of standards for that type of source. Id. §§ 7411(a)(1)-(2). Portland
Cement Ass'n v. Train, 513 F.2d 506, 509 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025
(1975), affirmed the EPA's ability to promulgate stationary source emission standards
for new or modified cement plants. The standards established by the EPA must,
however, be supported by adequate data in the record. See, e.g., National Lime
Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 452-54 (D.C.Cir. 1980) (new source standards for lime
manufacturing plants were challenged successfully as being explained inadequately
by EPA's documentary evidence).
42 U.S.C. § 7412 relates to hazardous air pollutants. A hazardous air pollutant is
one which "may reasonably be anticipated to result in an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness." Id. § 7412(a)(1).
The EPA Administrator is authorized to promulgate emission standards for such
sources, id. § 7412(b), and to enforce the standards, id. § 7412(d)(2).
Nonattainment areas are regulated in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508. A nonattainment
area is one which exceeds NAAQS for a particular pollutant. Id. § 7501. The Act
requires that state plans provide for air pollution control measures designed to
improve air quality in nonattainment areas, id. § 7502(a)(1), and for control of
emissions from both existing sources in the area and new or modified stationary
facilities, id. §§ 7502(b)(3)-(6).
42 U.S.C. §§ 7521-7551 authorizes the EPA to establish emission standards for new
motor vehicles and motor vehicle engines, id. § 7521(a)(1), and to regulate fuels, id. §
7545. In Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976), the court upheld the EPA's ability to promulgate regulations which reduced
the lead content of gasoline. The success of these strategies is demonstrated by a
recent study of 23 urban areas which indicated that violations of National Ambient
Air Quality Standards decresed 18 % between 1974 and 1978. COUNCIL ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 146 (1980). In 1974 the aggregate
number of days in which national air quality standards were violated was 1,985
while the number of days in violation in 1978 fell to 1,637. Id. at 147.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1). Each state must promulgate a plan to control the
pollution from a particular source within nine months after the Administrator formu-
lates a primary or secondary standard for that pollutant. The Act also provides for a
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for achievement of satisfactory air quality levels. 1 3 The Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA), the federal agency responsible for
achieving Clean Air Act objectives, has been granted a wide variety of
implementation and enforcement powers. 14  In addition, private
rights of action 15 and federal funding sanctions against recalcitrant
states 16 are authorized by the Act.
three year implementation period following the date of plan approval, id. §
7410(a)(2)(A)(i), with a two year extension to be granted at the Administrator's
discretion, id. § 7410(e)(1).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2).
14. The Administrator is responsible for the setting of National Ambient Air
Quality Standards, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1); approval or disapproval of an SIP sub-
mitted by a state, id. § 7410(a)(2); promulgation of the EPA's own regulations for
any state which fails to submit a satisfactory plan, id. § 7410(c)(1); and extension of
compliance deadlines in appropriate circumstances, id. § 7410(e)(1). The Adminis-
trator is also the initiating party in a suit against violators, and his interpretation of
the air pollution regulations is accorded significant weight by the courts. For exam-
ple, in Chrysler v. EPA, 631 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1980), Chrysler had been ordered
by the Administrator to recall all 1975 vehicles of certain engine displacements which
failed to meet the established auto emission standards. Chrysler's challenge of the
Administrator's interpretation of the regulation in question was denied, with the
court noting that the Administrator's interpretation, although not controlling, is
certainly to be considered authoritative Id. at 884.
The United States Supreme Court upheld executive agency discretion in Strycker's
Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980), a case that involved
opposition to a proposed low income housing project in Manhattan. The Court said
that as long as the federal agency complies with the procedural requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act its decision will not be disturbed by the judiciary.
Id. at 227-28. The right of agencies to formulate their own procedures in areas for
which they are substantively responsible was earlier upheld in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 7604. Several types of citizen suits are authorized by the Act,
including actions against pollution sources, governmental entities and the EPA itself.
In Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
a citizens' group sought to compel compliance with federal pollution standards. The
court approved the utilization of such citizen suits against private pollution sources in
cases where governmental enforcement efforts are less than diligent. Friends of the
Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976), involved a citizens' suit against New
York State to obtain court-mandated implementation of the New York TCP. Plain-
tiffs were granted the requested relief, thus affirming judicial acceptance of citizen
suits against governmental instrumentalities. Citizen suits against the EPA generally
have involved challenges to EPA-promulgated regulations, e.g., South Terminal
Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974) (upholding the Administrator's transpor-
tation control measures for the Boston area); and challenges to the ambient standards
set by the EPA, e.g., American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (challenging the EPA standards on permissible levels of ozone); Lead Industries
Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.) (petition to review EPA-promulgated
standards for lead), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 7506(a)-(c) provides for withholding of federal funds for a state's
failure to submit an original or revised plan or to implement a plan for a non-
attainment area and for loss of federal air quality planning and regulatory funds for
failure to implement a state's plan. It has been suggested that the language of §
7506(c) may result in withholding of federal funds for any state project or planning
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Transportation controls "[a]re measures designed to reduce emis-
sions from transportation vehicles after they have left the manufac-
turer."' 7  Transportation control provisions of the Clean Air Act
permit the use of a variety of programs and procedures to reduce and
regulate vehicular air pollution including: motor vehicle inspection
and maintenance; improved public transit; bus and car pool lanes;
staggered work hours; control of on-street parking; construction and
operation of park and ride facilities; employer participation in car
pooling, van pooling, and mass transit; road use charges, tolls, and
differential toll rates for single occupancy vehicles; and improved
traffic flow. 18
Proposed changes to the transportation control measures of the Act
eliminate vehicle inspection and maintenance as a required part of
any regulation and relax carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxide stand-
ards.19 Since carbon monoxide is one of the leading sources of air
activity which might contribute to pollution levels in non-attainment areas. Com-
ment, The Implementation of Transportation Controls under the 1977 Clean Air Act
Amendments, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 247, 267 (1979). These sanctions would apply to
such state endeavors as highway and sewage projects, both of which could present
significant pollution problems. Congressional Research Service, Environment and
Natural Resources Policy Division, Issue Brief No. IB80078, The Clean Air Act: An
Overview 4 (July 5, 1981).
17. AMERICAN LAW DIVISION, supra note 9, at 71.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (f)(1)(A). Vehicle inspection and maintenance programs
involve annual measurement of vehicle exhausts coupled with penalties for noncom-
pliance with the applicable emission standard. A penalty that has been utilized
extensively is denial of registration to noncomplying vehicles. In United States v.
Ohio Dep't of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
949 (1981), the court validated the EPA's ability to promulgate a regulation with-
holding registration from vehicles failing to pass the emission test if a state refuses to
formulate such a regulation. Motor vehicle inspection programs can be operated
either by the state or by private contractors or garages. New York has concluded that
both systems are cost-effective, although the expenditure required for a state-run
system would be substantially greater. NEW YORK STATE DF"T OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSERVATION, AIR QUALITY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN V-9-12 (1979).
The other major transportation control devices, such as bus and car pool lanes,
park and ride facilities, and control of on-street parking, are designed to reduce the
number of cars on the road by discouraging motorists from driving to work. Traffic
flow regulations seek to improve the management of roadway capacity, often accom-
plished by control of access to various road arteries, reversible lanes, and roadway
widening. Id. at V-69.
The Act also provides for other transportation control measures, such as reduction
of extended idling in order to reduce emission production, bicycle lanes, staggered
work hours, limitation on use of certain areas to non-motorized vehicles or pedestri-
ans, and retrofit (installation of pollution control devices) of on-the-road vehicles. 42
U.S.C. § 7408(f)(1)(A).
19. MEMORANDUM, supra note 3, at 2, 5. The standard for carbon monoxide would
be changed from 3.4 grams per vehicle mile to 7.0 grams per vehicle mile for
passenger cars; the standard for nitrogen oxide would be changed from 1.0 grams per
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pollution, 20 environmental groups are strongly opposed to any altera-
tion of Clean Air Act provisions. 21 However, whether or not Con-
gress amends the Act as proposed, the increasing number of motor
vehicles operating within urban areas22 necessitates expanded utiliza-
tion of other transportation control strategies.
III. State Plans for Transportation Control
Pursuant to the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, states were
required to submit revised SIP's by July 1, 1979.23 Implementation of
the transportation control provisions of these revised SIP's will involve
some of the problems which New York and Texas have encountered in
implementing their TCP's.
A. The New York Plan
New York was one of the first states to submit an SIP to the EPA for
approval. 24 The plan incorporated numerous transportation control
vehicle mile to 1.5 grams per vehicle mile for passenger cars (beginning in 1983). Id.
at 5.
20. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 153
(1980). Carbon monoxide was the leading cause of NAAQS violation in 6 of the 23
urban areas. Id. Although the overall level of carbon monoxide remained relatively
unchanged from 1970 to 1978 the sources did not necessarily remain the same;
increased motor vehicle emissions were offset by reduced carbon monoxide emissions
from burning solid wastes. Id. at 171.
21. See, e.g., Robinson, Debating Revisions to Clean-Air Act, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 25,
1981, at 1, col. 1. Critics of the proposed revisions believe that emphasis will be
shifted from health to cost considerations in establishing and enforcing standards. See
also N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1981, at All, col. 1, in which the fear of deteriorating air
quality is expressed.
22. There were approximately 118 million automobiles and 31 million trucks on
American roads in 1979. 29 Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 55, 55-56 (1979). The number of
vehicle-miles traveled increased 30 % between 1970 and 1978. COUNCIL ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 171 (1980).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (a)(3)(D). By September 2, 1980 all 50 states and the District
of Columbia submitted their SIP's. The EPA deemed forty of the plans to be com-
plete. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 183 (1980).
The plans were required to include measures for achievement of carbon monoxide
and ozone standards by 1987, with provision for mandatory motor vehicle inspection
and maintenance programs if the state cannot comply with the carbon monoxide and
ozone standards before 1987. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ELEVENTH
ANNUAL REPORT 183 (1980). The motor vehicle inspection and maintenance pro-
grams were required to be operational by the end of 1981 if decentralized, and by the
end of 1982 if centralized. Id. See note 18 supra for a discussion of vehicle inspection
and maintenance programs. Twenty-nine states are required to implement motor
vehicle inspection and maintenance programs because they requested compliance
extensions until 1987. These programs affect various metropolitan areas including
Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, New York and Phila-
delphia. A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO CLEAN AIR AND TRANSPORTATION 59 (1980).
24. Gerrard, The Transportation Control Plan Rides Again, 6 N.Y AFFAIRS 21, 22
(1980). The New York plan was submitted by the April, 1973 statutory deadline and
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strategies including: emission control strategies; 25 traffic control poli-
cies such as increased enforcement of traffic and parking regulations,
selective ban on taxi cruising, reduction of parking spaces in Manhat-
tan, and tolls on all East River and Harlem River Bridges; 26 and
provisions for improved mass transit facilities. 27
Following EPA approval, the plan was challenged by citizens'
groups in Friends of the Earth v. EPA .2 8 It was alleged that the plan
contained vague and ambiguous implementation procedures and
lacked essential provisions, including specific conformance time-tables
and a transit fare freeze. 29  Although the court affirmed EPA's plan
approval, 30 the state avoided implementing the transportation control
measures. Friends of the Earth returned to court 3' to seek an order
compelling performance. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit ordered implementation, 32 but the district court
refused to enforce the compliance order. 33 The plaintiffs then initi-
was approved on June 22, 1973. The EPA granted a requested extension to December
31, 1976 for compliance with air quality standards. Id.
25. Id. at 23. Emission control elements of the SIP involved vehicle turnover,
replacing older vehicles with new emission-efficient ones; retrofitting trucks with
pollution control devices; motor vehicle inspection and maintenance programs; elim-
ination of leaded gasoline; and emission controls for taxis. Id.
26. Other measures designed to decrease traffic congestion included after-hours
deliveries to stores, offices, and factories; and staggered work hours. Id. Several
different types of flexible work schedules exist, but the most common are flexitime,
where the individual works a flexible number of hours per day, and a compressed
work-week, in which two to four days usually are worked each week rather than
five. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 28, 1981, at 76.
27. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, AIR QUALITY IM-
PLEMENTATION PLAN 1-5 (1979). The mass transit section of the 1973 document
included provisions for increased express bus service, marketing the public transit
system, time table simplification, reduced fare, advance fare payment, integration of
bus and subway facilities, and rehabilitation of the existing transit system.
28. 499 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1974). Friends of the Earth is an active environmental
group currently maintaining a membership of between 25,000 and 30,000.
29. Id. at 1123-25.
30. Id. at 1124. The court, however, was critical of the parking space reduction
strategy because statements advocating reduction of on-and-off-street parking facili-
ties in Manhattan business districts were included in the plan, without any specificity
as to which facilities were being referred to. Id. at 1123-24. The court also required
more information on the data used by the Administrator to conclude that the parking
strategy would be effective, since his document assumed that a reduction in parking
spaces would produce a proportional decrease in miles traveled by passenger cars, an
assumption whose veracity the court questioned. Id. at 1125.
31. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976) (Friends II). The
plaintiffs sought to enforce four of the major strategies of the 1973 SIP-parking
space reduction, a taxicab cruising ban, bridge tolls, and after-hours freight deliv-
eries. Id. at 171 n.7.
32. Id.at 179.
33. Gerrard, supra note 24, at 24. On July 13, 1976 the district court withdrew
the compliance order which it had issued in response to the decision in Friends II
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ated a third suit, in which the court of appeals again issued an order
compelling implementation of the New York Transportation Control
Plan. 34
New York State continued to resist the implemention of the trans-
portation control measures and was able to obtain through the Moyni-
han-Holtzman Amendment 35 to the Clean Air Act, the relief denied it
by the court. The amendment permitted the state to eliminate the
bridge toll strategy from its SIP on condition that it formulate a
comprehensive transit proposal within one year. The revised plan was
required to include measures designed to improve mass transit and to
maintain national ambient air standards .3
New York formulated a revised SIP in 1979.37 The new plan places
primary emphasis on mass transit improvements, 38 seeking to main-
tain national ambient standards through programs involving control
of land use and development, parking restrictions, express bus and car
pool lanes, traffic flow controls, alternate work schedules, employer-
because it felt that the tenth and eleventh amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion prohibit the federal government from compelling a state to comply with its own
SIP provisions. Id.
34. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied subnom.
Beame v. Friends of the Earth, 434 U.S. 902 (1977). For a further discussion of the
Friends cases, see Note, Friends of the Earth v. Carey: Enforcing the Clean Air Act,
9 TRANSP. L.J. 411,(1977).
35. Pub. L. No. 95-95, §§ 108 (d)(3)(5)(A), (B), amending § 110 (c), 91 Stat. 685,
694-95 (1977). For a further discussion see NATIONAL RESouRcEs DEFENSE COUNCIL,
INC., COMMENTS ON NEW YORK STATE AIR QUALITY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR MASS
TRANSIT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE NEw YORK CITY METROPOLITAN AREA 9-17 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as NRDC]. The Amendment was signed into law in August, 1977.
36. NRDC, supra note 35, at 13. Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman had or-
chestrated the effort to have the bridge toll strategy removed from the New York SIP.
The resulting amendment emphasized the substitution of a mass transportation
control strategy for the imposition of bridge tolls and required that the state allocate
adequate funds for implementation of the amended plan. The amendment also
contained a provision requiring measures for the attainment and maintenance of
national air quality standards in order that the air pollution benefits of tolls be
retained. Id. at 9-17. The public transit aspect of this strategy has been interpreted
by EPA Administrator Costle to require "[t]he upgrading of public transportation to
the point where it is not significantly less attractive than auto travel." Id. at 17. The
New York SIP seeks to define the improvement standard more precisely, by reference
to passenger comfort, including crowding, air conditioning and noise factors. 45 Fed.
Reg. 43800 (1980).
37. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, AIR QUALITY IM-
PLEMENTATION PLAN (1979).
38. Id. at 20-33. Provisions of the transit improvement section of the plan include
a design for more effective management of the transit system (improved capital
planning and project management, and improved system maintenance), stabilization
of the fare, modernization of the transit facilities (air conditioning subway cars,
renovating stations, and reducing subway noise are specifically advocated), and
marketing the transit system.
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based programs, and park-and-ride facilities. 39 Omitted were man-
datory imposition of tolls on East River and Harlem River bridges,
restrictions on taxi cruising, and motor vehicle inspection and mainte-
nance for all but passenger cars and medallion cabs. 40  The principal
reason for the major strategy change between 1973 and 1979 involved
fear of the economic consequences of many of the earlier plan's provi-
sions. 4' Other concerns included the possibility of massive traffic
congestion at East River toll plazas, resulting in unhealthful levels of
air pollution. 42 The EPA conditionally approved the New York SIP 43
39. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, AIR QUALITY IM-
PLEMENTATION PLAN (1979). The staggered work hour strategy is already widely
used-9.5 million workers in the United States are involved in either flexitime or a
compressed work week arrangement. The efficacy of this strategy is illustrated in
Denver, where a compressed work week for about 7,000 federal employees reduced
automobile travel 16%, thereby decreasing emissions, fuel consumption and traffic
congestion. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 28, 1981, at 76-77.
40. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, AIR QUALITY IM-
PLEMENTATION PLAN 1-4-6 (1979).
41. Gerrard, supra note 24, at 24-25. There were claims of large business losses
which would result from implementation of the program, including one estimate of
"more than $100 million" if the provisions on parking restrictions, taxi cruising,
bridge tolls, and after-hours deliveries were implemented. Id. However, no objective
data were advanced to support this view. Id. at 25.
42. Id. at 26. For a further discussion of this issue see note 107 infra. Toll
advocates believed that the tolls would have provided enormous revenues for use in
improving mass transit, while actually decreasing air pollution. NRDC, supra note
35, at 8. In 1973 it was estimated that the East River and Harlem River Bridge tolls
would produce $125 million annually in revenue; a 1976 estimate by the State
Department of Transportation showed net revenues of $141 million annually. Id.
The air pollution benefits were expected to result primarily from "straightening out"
trips-drivers would no longer make detours to avoid toll bridges and tunnels. After
imposition of the toll plan all sources of access to Manhattan would maintain toll
charges. The State Department of Transportation estimated the air pollution savings
at 5-6% citywide and 9.2 % in Manhattan. Id.
43. Conditional approval requires that the entity submit additional documenta-
tion to the EPA according to a pre-arranged schedule. 45 Fed. Reg. 33983 (1980).
The provisions not related to mass transit were approved conditionally on May 21,
1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 33981 (1980). The mass transit sections were disapproved initially
on June 30, 1980, id. 43794, due to insufficient provision for operational and man-
agement improvement and budgetary allocations. The EPA felt initially that New
York's $427 million annual commitment to the transit improvement fund was insuffi-
cient based on the budgetary figures provided. In particular, it noted that certain
required costs were not accounted for in the budget at all, including maintenance
costs necessary to end the deferred maintenance program, additional funds for transit
police, and increased operating costs resulting from defects in certain subway cars. 45
Fed. Reg. 43800-03 (1980).
The mass transit aspect of the plan was granted conditional approval on Septem-
ber 9, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 44979 (1981), after additional information was provided to
the EPA which allayed its reservations regarding the plan's adequacy. Specifically,
the EPA learned that a New York tax increase would raise up to $400 million




and granted New York an extension until December 31, 1987, to
attain compliance with ozone and carbon monoxide standards within
the metropolitan area.44
Enforcement of the transportation control provisions of the 1979
plan by private parties will be rendered more difficult by the decision
in New England Legal Foundation v. Costle,45 which eliminated one
type of federal sanction from application against a state for noncom-
pliance with a transportation control plan's provisions. In an action
brought by Connecticut citizens, municipalities and organizations 4 to
compel the EPA to suspend federal grants 47 to New York State, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's48
finding that the EPA has no mandatory duty to suspend federal grants
for non-implementation of the transportation control aspects of SIP's.
The court stated that the legislative history of the funding sanction
provisions indicates that the sanctions only apply to plan revisions
required under the 1977 Amendments. Since transportation controls
were necessitated by earlier legislation the court held that TCP's were
not subject to the funding sanctions. 49
In addition, the efficacy of utilizing citizen suits to compel enforce-
ment of TCP provisions may be affected by a recent case in which a
commuter organization sued the Metropolitan Transportation Au-
thority and the Tri-State Regional Planning Commission (Tri-State)50
to compel Tri-State to enforce the transportation provisions of the
New York SIP. The plaintiffs alleged that Tri-State failed to effec-
tively enforce or implement the transportation control strategies of the
New York State Implementation Plans of 1973 and 1979. The com-
44. 45 Fed. Reg. 33982 (1980).
45. 632 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980).
46. Plaintiffs alleged that air pollution from New York and New Jersey was
carried to Connecticut by winds, and had a harmful effect on residents' health. Id. at
937.
47. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
48. New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 475 F. Supp. 425 (D. Conn. 1979).
Plaintiffs contended that the EPA had the duty to compel New York and New Jersey
to revise and implement their SIP provisions on stationary sources and transportation
controls. Id. at 429. However, the court found that the deadlines established by the
1977 amendments for attainment of standards had not yet passed. Thus, the EPA did
not have a duty to promulgate regulations or invoke sanctions against a state for
noncompliance. Id. at 432-34.
49. 632 F.2d at 938.
50. The Tri-State Regional Planning Commission is responsible for promulgating
a coordinated transportation improvement program for the New York-New Jersey-
Connecticut area. Its staged, multi-year Transportation Improvement Program pro-
vides for capital and operating improvements for the Tri-State area. NEW YORK STATE
DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, AIR QUALITY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN IV-2,
IV-5 (1979).
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plaint emphasized the defendant's inadequate planning for improve-
ment of the area's mass transit instrumentalities. 51 The district court
ruled that Tri-State, although vested with planning authority, lacks
enforcement capability.5 2 As a result, Tri-State was not held respon-
sible for implementing transportation control strategies.
B. The Texas Plan
The Texas response to the air pollution problem posed by motor
vehicles has been very different from the New York plan, dictated in
large part by the absence of significant mass transit systems in its
major cities. The initial commitments of the Texas TCP which re-
cently have been incorporated into the Texas SIP by the Houston-
Galveston Area Council,5 3 emphasize the expansion of the existing van
and car pool programs.5 4
51. Council of Commuter Orgs. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 515 F. Supp. 36,
37 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
52. Id. at 38. The court noted that neither the agency nor its officers have the
power to implement or enforce its recommendations, and that the legislation creating
the agency expressly states that it is not subject to suit in any court. Id.
53. HOUSTON-GALVESTON AREA COUNCIL, supra note 7.
54. Id. at II-1. As of October 1980, 64 companies maintained van pool programs
with an estimated 14,948 riders. Seven independent operators also ran such pro-
grams. It has been estimated that average employee participation in employer spon-
sored van pool programs is 30 %, with the potential ridership in companies of 250 or
more employees (in one location) to be 34,400 by 1987. BARTON-ASCHMAN Associ-
ATES, INC., EMPLOYER RELATED AIR QUALITY TRANSPORTATION CONTROL MEASURES
18-25 (1981) [hereinafter cited as BARTON-ASCHMAN]. Approximately 35% of large
companies maintain car pool programs, and the level of employee participation in
those programs is about 33 %. Id. at 47-48. Approximately 2000 van pools are now in
operation in the Houston-Galveston metropolitan area. It is estimated that an additional
4,400 van pools will be in operation in the area by 1987. The van pool sponsors include
private employers, the Metropolitan Transit Authority, the State Department of High-
ways and Public Transportation, county and city entities, and private organizations
serving groups of employers. HOUSTON-GALVESTON AmA COUNCIL, supra note 7, at II 1-
3. One of the prime incentives to employer participation in the van pool program is
M.T.A. cost assistance. Only 20% of the van purchase price is paid by the employer,
while 80% of the cost is assumed by the M.T.A. Employers are responsible for funding
the van's operating expenses. Id. at 11-8.
The Houston-Galveston Area Council study indicates that van pools and car pools
possess substantial potential for emissions' reductions compared to other transporta-
tion control measures contained in the area-wide program. Based on a projected
figure of about 6,300 vans being in operation by 1987 it was estimated that without a
motor vehicle inspection and maintenance program, emission reductions would vary
between 0.6 % and 2.7 % annually for hydrocarbons, a reduction of between 180 and
850 tons per year, with a net reduction of 1460 tons in the year 1987. BARTON-
ASCHMAN, supra at 33-34. The car pool program is estimated to result in annual
hydrocarbon reduction of 1.6% to 4.1%, without a vehicle inspection program, a
decrease of between 470 and 1,280 tons annually. Id. at 57. These findings were
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The Houston-Galveston Area Council commitments also include
plans for expansion of its park-and-ride express bus program 55 and
improvement of local bus service and bus maintenance facilities.56
Traffic flow measures, including redesign of access routes into Hous-
ton, currently are under consideration for incorporation into future
commitment papers.5 7
Like its New York counterpart, the Texas SIP has not been free
from judicial scrutiny. In Texas v. EPA,58 the state challenged the
EPA's power to determine the adequacy of its SIP and to promulgate
additional regulations to be included in the state's plan. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invoked the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard as the basis for reviewing administrative
agency actions59 and held that the EPA had properly exercised its
discretion in determining that the Texas plan was inadequate. " More
importantly, the court allowed the EPA to promulgate additional
regulations for a state if the provisions of the state's plan were unsatis-
factory."6
The court of appeals again supported the EPA's position in City of
Seabrook v. EPA,6 2 where a petition by a municipality and several
based on decrease in vehicle miles traveled, and the effect of that reduction on
emissions' levels. Id. at 33.
55. The M.T.A. now maintains eleven park-and-ride lots, and express buses carry
over 6,000 riders daily in each direction. The M.T.A.'s 1982 budget has committed
$41 million for expansion and construction of park-and-ride facilities. It is estimated
that the new lots will provide approximately 6,600 new parking spaces. HOUSTON-
GALVESTON AREA COUNCIL, supra note 7, at III-1.
56. The M.T.A. plans to purchase 641 new buses in the period 1982-1986, and to
have a 900 bus fleet by 1987. Id. at IV-1.
57. Id. at 1-2. The purpose of the traffic flow improvements would be to reduce
traffic congestion by redesigning intersections, widening road surfaces, and improv-
ing traffic signal patterns. BARTON-ASCHMAN, supra note 54, at 13. See note 6 supra
for a further discussion of traffic flow measures.
58. 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 905 (1976).
59. Id. at 296. The "arbitrary and capricious" standard has been utilized univer-
sally by the courts in evaluating the viability of an EPA directive since the inception
of the Clean Air Act. AMERICAN LAW DIVISION, supra note 9, at 157. See, e.g.,
American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (standard
applied to the Administrator's formulation of NAAQS for ozone); South Terminal
Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974) (standard applied in determining the
validity of an EPA-promulgated transportation plan for Boston). In Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), which also dealt with the
validity of an administrative agency action, the Court defined "arbitrary and capri-
cious" as "[w]hether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors
and whether there has been a clear error in judgement." Id. at 416.
60. Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d at 294.
61. Id. However, the court did find that several of the regulations formulated by
the EPA were invalid, i.e., the gasoline marketing regulations. Id. at 321.
62. 659 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981).
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private citizens called for EPA approval of various portions of the
Texas SIP to be set aside. The plaintiffs contended that the EPA's
conditional approval of several sections of the plan was not authorized
by the Clean Air Act. They interpreted the Act to require either
approval or disapproval, while the EPA maintained its ability to grant
conditional approval for substantial conpliance. 3  The Seabrook
plaintiffs also argued that the SIP provision on motor vehicle inspec-
tion and maintenance programs required a mandatory program,
while the EPA argued that the provision only required that the pro-
gram be phased in over a period of years. 4 The court upheld the
EPA's position on both issues because the agency's interpretation of
the regulations was not "arbitrary or capricious. '" 65
IV. TCP Implementation Problems
The implementation of transportation controls may produce a vari-
ety of legal and practical difficulties. Several transportation control
measures, such as parking and traffic restrictions, involve a limitation
of individual movement. Other transportation controls, such as the
motor vehicle inspection and maintenance programs, require that
states perform certain actions in order to comply with federal direc-
tives-raising the issue of infringement of state sovereignty. Finally,
the implementation of van and car pool programs raises practical
considerations such as insurance and tax issues.
A. Legal Implications
Transportation control measures present a variety of legal issues
including constitutional questions. The viability of such regulations
depends upon the nature of the individual right and the importance of
the societal interest involved. Only compelling governmental interest
can justify the infringement of a fundamental right. 6 However, even
63. Id. at 1353.
64. Id. at 1363-64.
65. Id. at 1359-64. See note 59 supra for a further discussion of the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard. The court noted that policy considerations support the EPA's
position on the conditional approval issue. One of the central purposes of the Clean
Air Act is to place the principal responsibility for air pollution control on the states,
and this purpose would be frustrated if promulgation of federal regulations were
preferred to a commitment by the states, in conditionally approved SIP's, to make
the required revisions. City of Seabrook, 659 F.2d at 1356.
66. Fundamental rights cannot be infringed upon by the government unless there
is a compelling state interest involved. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
638 (1969) (promotion of compelling governmental interest needed in order to limit
the fundamental right to travel); Matter of Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 22
N.Y.2d 488, 494, 239 N.E.2d 891, 895, 293 N.Y.S.2d 297, 302 (1968) (only a direct
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if a balancing of the interests results in a determination that the
regulation is valid, any individual who sustains damage thereby may
be eligible to receive compensation.
The restriction or prohibition of parking may entitle landowners
Within the designated areas to receive just compensation 67 for loss of
traffic flow past their business establishments and reduction of access
to their facilities. These two issues are often linked, as loss of traffic
flow causes reduced access under certain circumstances.
6 8
Restrictions on access are widely recognized as constituting com-
pensable injury to the landowner,6 9 but there is substantial disagree-
and immediate adverse effect on the community's health, safety, or welfare would
prelude expansion of a house of worship). Control of air pollution certainly is related
to community health, but the question remains unresolved as to whether it is a
compelling enough interest to permit infringement on a fundamental right.
67. The United States Constitution provides that private property shall not "[b]e
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
framers of the Constitution were concerned primarily with governmental seizure of
tangible property, personal property in particular, but the concept of 'property' has
been expanded over the last two'hundred years to include rights, privileges, and
duties. Kanner, Restrictive Covenants in Condemnation: Bringing Equity into Just
Compensation, 1976 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 237, 239 (1976).
Since the 1870's, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility that a "taking"
could exist without an actual appropriation by the government, as when there is a
substantial interference with the owner's right to the use of his property through, for
example, a severe regulation. Id. at 240-41.
The measure of compensation to be paid for property involves placing the owner in
as good a position as he would have been in if the property had not been taken.
Searles, Eminent Domain: A Kaleidoscopic View, 1 REAL EST. L. J. 226, 237 (1973).
The value of the property is not necessarily its current fair market value, but its value
at the "highest and best use" of which it is capable. For example, in Glenn Houle Co.
v. State, 73 A.D.2d 794, 423 N.Y.S.2d 714 (4th Dep't 1979), the property seized
consisted of a rooming house, but the area already was zoned heavy commercial. The
value of the property was established with reference to the commercial use which
was permissible and which provided a higher measure of compensation than would
the current residential value, discounted for the time required to convert the prop-
erty from one best use to another. Id. at 795, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 716. See also Schwartz
v. State, 72 A.D.2d 490, 426 N.Y.S.2d 100 (3d Dep't 1980) (probability of waiving a
convenant restricting use of the property to residential purposes was considered in
determining the value of the property); Rosenblum v. State, 70 A.D.2d 694, 416
N.Y.S.2d 398 (3d Dep't 1979) (parcel of land designated as having a highest and best
use as a gas station even though it was currently zoned commercial because there was
a reasonable probability that it could be reconverted to a gas station).
68. See, e.g., City of Colorado Springs v. Smartt, __ Colo. __, 620 P.2d 1060
(1981), in which the Supreme Court of Colorado permitted the rezoning of a particu-
lar parcel of land on the condition that access be limited to a certain street, as a
control on traffic flow. The court reasoned that limiting the number of access routes
to the property would provide a control on the amount of noise, air pollution and
traffic congestion engendered by the landowner's proposed use. Id. at __, 620 P.2d
at 1061-62.
69. See State Dep't of Highways v. Davis, - Colo. __, 626 P.2d 661 (1981)
(condemnation of adjoining land produced more circuitous access); D'Addario v.
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ment as to the extent of deprivation required before the loss of access
rises to the level of a compensable injury. Some courts require that loss
of access be substantial.70 For example, it has been held that required
use of a more circuitous route does not constitute a compensable
damage. 7' However, another court considered any limitation which
impedes complete and unobstructed access to constitute a compensa-
ble damage. 7' However, another court considered any limitation.
which impedes complete and unobstructed access to constitute a com-
pensable injury, 72 such as the required passage over landfill in a
culvert constructed directly across the property's entrance way. 73 In
addition, it is not certain that loss of traffic flow past a business
property constitutes a compensable injury. Although diversion of traf-
fic was deemed to constitute a compensable injury where it reduced
the value of the plaintiff's property in one case,74 another court found
that the continuation of traffic flow past a landowner's property was
not a property right in which the owner had a vested interest.75
The utilization of parking restrictions as a transportation control
strategy involves an additional consideration. Although local govern-
ments may impose reasonable limitations on the use of their streets
and highways for purposes of public health, morals, safety or conven-
Commissioner of Transp., 180 Conn. 355, 429 A.2d 890 (1980) (restricted access due
to condemnation of part of plaintiff's property); Downside Risk, Inc. v. Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 156 Ga. App. 209, 274 S.E.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1980)
(restriction of access amounts to a taking); State Dep't of Transp. v. Van Willett, 386
So. 2d 1023 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (expropriation resulted in diversion of traffic);
Legislature of County of Monroe v. Morgan, 78 A.D.2d 761, 433 N.Y.S.2d 639 (4th
Dep't 1980) (relocation of road resulted in indirect access).
70. See, e.g., Legislature of County of Monroe v. Morgan, 78 A.D.2d 761, 762,
433 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (4th Dep't 1980) (property owner is not entitled to compensa-
tion for being reduced to indirect or less than ideal access).
71. State Dep't of Highways v. Davis, __ Colo .... 626 P.2d 661, 664 (1981).
72. See, e.g., Downside Risk, Inc. v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth.,
156 Ga. App. 209. 214, 274 S.E.2d 653, 658 (Ct. App. 1980) (rendering ingress and
egress more difficult constitutes a compensable injury).
73. D'Addario v. Commissioner of Transp., 180 Conn. 355, __, 429 A.2d 890,
894 (1980).
74. State Dep't of Transp. v. Van Willett, 386 So. 2d 1023, 1035 (La. Ct. App.
1980). The defendant failed to prove that lack of access or visibility resulting from
expropriation of his property would reduce the value of that part of the tract
remaining in his possession. Therefore, no severance damages were awarded.
75. Division of Admin. v. Capital Plaza, Inc., 397 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1981). The
Department of Transportation widened the road abutting the plaintiff's property,
and constructed a raised median to divide the directional lanes. Capital Plaza con-
tended that the loss of traffic flow past its gas station constituted a compensable
injury, but the court found that a landowner has no right to continued traffic flow
past his property. Id.
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ience,76 classifications of regulated vehicles cannot be arbitrary or
capricious. For example, an ordinance which prohibited limousine
drivers from embarking or disembarking passengers except at one
designated location was found to be arbitrary and unreasonable be-
cause taxis were not included in the regulatory scheme, although they
operate in a manner similar to limousines. 77
If parking restrictions are carried to their extreme, an actual ban on
automobiles from certain parts of the city, there may be an infringe-
ment on the fundamental right to travel. 78 The right to travel clearly
is recognized, 7  although the extent of this freedom is not precisely
defined. In a case involving a tax paid only by nonresident commuters
one court indicated that interstate migration, not merely interstate
movement, is constitutionally protected.80 However, in ruling on the
issue of whether the failure to provide adequate police protection
interferes with the right to travel, another court did not differentiate
76. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (city regulation
prohibited participation in parade or procession without a permit); Illinois Migrant
Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 519 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1975) (refusal of access to
residential community); Nampa v. Swayne, 97 Idaho 530, 547 P.2d 1135 (1976)
(proceeding to require a leaseholder to remove signs encroaching over public street).
77. Wilson v. City of Waynesville, 615 S.W.2d 640, 646 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
Parking taxes also may present a legal problem. New York State has enacted legisla-
tion imposing a tax on the provision of parking, garaging, or storing of motor vehicles
within the territorial limits of cities containing one million or more people. N.Y. TAX
LAW § 1107 (c) (McKinney 1981-82). However, in Airway Arms, Inc. v. Moon Area
School Dist., __ Pa. Commw. -, 428 A.2d 1028 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981), the court
invalidated a 15 % parking tax imposed on users of parking lots adjacent to the local
airport as constituting a violation of the commerce and due process clauses of the
United States Constitution. The court also noted that the tax exceeds the limitations
established by the local Tax Enabling Act. Id. at __, 428 A.2d at 1029. The court
failed to mention Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974), in which a
20 % tax on the gross receipts from parking facilities was found to be constitutional.
The Pittsburgh Court did not, however, preclude the possibility that a taxing statute
could violate the due process clause if it is so arbitrary as to constitute an exertion of a
nontaxing power, e.g., one involving the confiscation of property. Id. at 374-75.
78. For a discussion of this issue, see Note, Legal Aspects of Banning Automobiles
from Municipal Business Districts, 7 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 412 (1971).
79. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The Court noted in its decision
"[t]hat the nature of our Federal Union and our Constitutional concepts of personal
liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and
breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably
burden or restrict this movement." Id. at 629.
80. Salorio v. Glaser, 82 N.J. 482, 513, 414 A.2d 943, 958, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
874 (1980), involved a challenge to a tax paid by New York residents who work in
New Jersey. The court found that the increased use of automobiles for commuting
purposes may be a justification for imposition of a discriminatory tax, but that the
state had not demonstrated that nonresidents were more responsible for resulting
emergency transportation situation than were state residents. Id. at 504-05, 414 A.2d
at 953-54.
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between interstate and intrastate travel in referring to the constitu-
tional limitations on interference with the fundamental right to tra-
vel. It only eliminated such travel as is particularly local in nature
from the sphere of protection. 81 A ban on parking would affect the
rights of all persons utilizing the restricted area, including local and
out-of-state patrons. Thus, unless constitutional protection only ex-
tends to interstate migration, parking regulations may infringe upon
the right to travel.
Motor vehicle inspection and maintenance programs are a source of
controversy because implementation involves the enacting of state
regulations and statutes, and expenditure of state funds. 82 The consti-
tutionality of this infringement on state sovereignty has been ques-
tioned by several circuit courts.8 3  However, a recent Sixth Circuit
decision which involved issues collateral to a vehicle inspection and
maintenance program did not challenge the validity of the program
itself.8 4 The court found that the EPA's ability to deny registration to
vehicles failing to pass the inspection was constitutionally permissible,
thus implicitly sanctioning the existence of the vehicle inspection pro-
gram .85
81. See Tetalman v. Holiday Inn, 500 F. Supp. 217, 218 (N.D. Ga. 1980). The
distinction also must be made between the right to travel and the right to travel by
automobile. However, it is contended that the absence of adequate alternative transit
modalities effectively would result in an infringement on the right to travel if denial
of automobile access to certain areas were legislated. Thus, the legislation would be
invalid by constitutional standards. See Note, Legal Aspects of Banning Automobiles
from Municipal Business Districts, 7 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PRoBs. 412, 431 (1971).
82. See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99,
aff'd., 566 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1977), in which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit expressed its displeasure with federal enforcement of state motor vehicle
inspection and maintenance programs because, in effect, Congress would be deter-
mining the regulations that a state must enact and how it should spend its funds. Id.
at 831.
83. See Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975) (invalidation of EPA-
promulgated regulations because they direct a state legislature to legislate), vacated
sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d
971 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (challenge to an EPA-promulgated TCP, which included an
inspection and maintenance program), vacated sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S.
99, reinstated in part and remanded in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Costle,
567 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975) (the
state-federal system would be undermined by permitting the EPA to impose sanctions
on a state for noncompliance with EPA regulations), vacated, 431 U.S. 99, aff'd, 566
F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1977).
84. United States v. Ohio Dep't of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949 (1981). Following the EPA promulgation of a motor
vehicle inspection and maintenance program for inclusion in the Ohio SIP for Cin-
cinnati and Hamilton Counties, Ohio refused to withhold registration from vehicles
which failed the emissions test. Id. at 1197.
85. Id. at 1205.
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The government has the power to impose tolls on its streets and
highways.8 6 However, courts steadfastly have maintained that such
tolls be applied in a non-discriminatory manner8 7 and that alterations
in toll rates not impair the contractual obligations between the high-
way authority and its bondholders.88 It is questionable, therefore,
whether utilization of differential toll rates 9 for multiple occupancy
vehicles would be upheld. One court, faced with determining the
viability of a state statute exempting National Guard members and
reservists from payment of a parkway toll, held that the statute was
invalid because the parkway authority has the contractual obligation
to collect tolls for the benefit of the holders of bonds issued to finance
highway construction.90  The reduction of toll charges for multiple
occupancy vehicles also would reduce the income of the highway
authority operating the toll facility and, consequently, the income
available for distribution to bondholders. Because the authority is
obligated to collect the maximum revenue possible in order to ensure
payments to its bondholders any scheme of differential toll rates might
be invalidated.
B. Practical Considerations
The utilization of van and car pool programs and tolls for transpor-
tation control produce a variety of practical problems which could be
solved by careful planning and, in some cases, legislative action.
Van and car pool programs involve statutory, tax, insurance and
enforcement difficulties, which might act as a deterrent to their inclu-
86. Virginia Canon Toll-Road Co. v. People ex rel. Vivian, 22 Colo. 429, 45 P.
398 (1896) (an individual or corporation cannot exact a toll without a grant from the
legislature); St. Joseph Plank Road Co. v. Kline, 106 La. 325, 30 So. 854 (1901)
(upholding conversion of a public highway into a toll road); In re Opinions of the
Justices, 81 N.H. 552, 120 A. 629 (1923) (legislature has the power to impose tolls on
roads and highways); In re People, 70 Misc. 72, 128 N.Y.S. 29 (Sup. Ct. Warren
County 1910) (only legislative authority can permit toll charges); Turner v. Eslick,
146 Tenn. 236, 240 S.W. 786 (1922) (right to collect tolls is a sovereign prerogative).
87. See, e.g., Carey Transp., Inc. v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth., 38
N.Y.2d 545, 345 N.E.2d 281, 381 N.Y.S.2d 811 (discriminatory toll charges among
similar vehicles based on arbitrary standards), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976);
Turner v. Eslick, 146 Tenn. 236, 240 S.W. 786 (1922) (discriminatory application of
tolls to horse-drawn vehicles).
88. New Jersey Highway Auth. v. Sills, 111 N. J. Super. 313, 268 A.2d 308 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1970) (invalidating toll exemption for National Guard members
and reservists), aJ'd, 58 N.J. 432, 278 A.2d 489 (1971); Patterson v. Carey, 41
N.Y.2d 714, 363 N.E.2d 1146, 395 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1977) (rescission of toll on Jones
Beach State Parkway impaired state's contract with bondholders).
89. Differential toll rates are variable toll rates for vehicles of different classifica-
tions (e.g. weight class, number of axles, or number of occupants).
90. Sills, 111 N.J. at 322, 268 A.2d at 312.
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sion in state transportation control provisions. Van and car pool pro-
grams create a tax liability problem for the driver to ihe extent that his
compensation exceeds his expenses.91 Programs such as the M.T.A.-
sponsored van pool program in Houston resolve this difficulty by
limiting the driver's compensation to the cost incurred in providing his
transportation.9 2 In addition, if the vehicle owner is compensated,
state statutes which regulate the transporting of passengers for com-
pensation must be complied with by the driver and employer. 3 Non-
compliance could result in substantial fines9 4 and the loss of the permit
to continue operating.9 5  To avoid such burdensome effects on all
parties concerned the contract carrier regulatory statutes should be
amended to provide less stringent regulations and penalties for van
pool and car pool programs. This action would prevent statutory
deterrence to employer and employee participation.
In the event of vehicular accidents insurance and liability problems
arise for the passenger, driver and vehicle owner. Since insurance
provisions excluding passengers from coverage are often valid" car
pool passengers may find themselves without insurance recourse if the
owner-driver's policy excludes them from coverage or if the vehicle
owner is totally without coverage. Other types of policy exclusions
might result in liability for the vehicle driver. For example, an insur-
ance policy clause excluding uninsured motorist coverage for the oper-
ation of vehicles not personally owned, but operated in the course of
employment, may be invalid as against public policy. The purpose of
the exclusion is to preclude coverage for injuries occuring in certain
91. 1.R.C. § 61 (a)(1) (P-H 1981). A recent case demonstrates the tax consequences
for a car or van pool driver who receives compensation in excess of his expenses. In
Ireland v. United States, 621 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1980), an executive utilized a
company-owned aircraft to travel between his Florida home and the company
headquarters in Birmingham, Alabama. The court determined that the I.R.S. cor-
rectly had assessed him for the value of the plane rides, and set the fair market value
of similar services as the standard of measurement. Id. at 737.
92. HOUSTON-GALVESTON AREA COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 11-6.
93. E.g., N.Y. TRANSP. LAW §§ 202, 203 (McKinney 1975). Section 203 requires
that all contract carriers of passengers for compensation by motor vehicle obtain a
permit from the Commissioner of Transportation. Section 202 authorizes the Com-
missioner to establish rules and regulations for supervision of such carriers, examine
their books and records, prescribe reasonable rates, and investigate accidents involv-
ing such carriers which cause death or injury to persons or property. Id. §§ 202 (1)-
(4).
94. E.g., N.Y. TrA.Nsp. LAW § 207 (McKinney 1967) (penalty of up to $1,000 for
each act of noncompliance).
95. Id. § 206.
96. See, e.g., Farmer's Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bakke, 619 F.2d 858, 888 (10th
Cir. 1980) (insurance policy clause excluding passenger from coverage is valid if
clear, unambiguous, and highly visible).
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locations, thus diluting the effect of the uninsured motorist statute. 97
Even if this position is accepted, however, it is not settled whether
driving a van or car pool vehicle to and from work would qualify as
being "in the course of employment. '9 8 If it were not so adjudicated,
coverage exclusions for the operation of vehicles not owned by the
driver may be valid.
The owner's liability for property damage and personal injury in-
curred in the course of a van or car pool program operated under his
auspices could also be quite extensive and require expensive insurance
coverage. 99 A solution to this liability problem would be the estab-
lishment of government-sponsored'0 0 low cost insurance for van and
car pool programs, similar to insurance already supplied by the gov-
ernment in areas where private insurance companies cannot economi-
97. Vidmar v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 99 Wis. 2d 398, 400, 299 N.W.2d
288, 289 (Ct. App. 1980), aff'd, 104 Wis. 2d 360, 312 N.W. 2d 129 (1981). A
policeman was injured while on duty and driving a police vehicle. His personal
insurance policy contained an exclusion clause for such a situation-operating a
vehicle of which he was not the owner in the course of employment.
98. Whether an activity is in the course of employment usually is determined by
the presence of employer control. For example, in Lundberg v. State, 25 N.Y.2d 467,
255 N.E.2d 177, 306 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1969), decedent was killed while driving home
for the weekend from the job site where he resided during the week. The court found
that no employer control existed during his drive to and from his home, and,
therefore, that the activity was not within the scope of his employment. Id. at 471-
72, 255 N.E.2d at 179, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 950-51. The Lundberg criteria later were
employed by the courts in Ehlenfield v. State, 62 A.D.2d 1151, 404 N.Y.S.2d 175
(4th Dep't 1978), and Nero v. Ris Paper Co., 60 A.D.2d 340, 400 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1st
Dep't 1978), aff'd, 46 N.Y.2d 967, 389 N.E.2d 141, 415 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1979), in
determining whether employees who were involved in vehicular accidents were
acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the accidents in order to
justify the imposition of liability upon their employers under the respondeat superior
theory..
99. BARTON-ASCHMAN, supra note 54, at 36.
100. In Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940), the plaintiff sought to invalidate a
Virginia statute which required that the insurance business only be conducted
through registered agents. The Court stated that it is within the state's power to fix
insurance rates, promote insurance, and even "[g]o into the insurance business .
Id. at 65-66. This sentiment was reiterated by the Court in California Auto Ass'n v.
Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 110 (1951) (validating the California Compulsory Assigned
Risk Law, which required all insurers to participate in an assigned risk insurance
program). The power of the state to require the purchase of insurance, enact compul-
sory health insurance, or take over the insurance business also was affirmed in
Borland v. Bayonne Hosp., 122 N.J. Super. 387, 398, 300 A.2d 584, 589-90 (Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1973) (action by union trustees to contest discriminatory hospital rates),
aff'd, 136 N.J. Super. 60, 344 A.2d 331 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), affd, 72 N.J.
152, 369 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 817 (1977).
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cally provide coverage, such as crop insurance, 101 flood insurance, 10 2
and riot reinsurance.10 3
Central to the difficulties inherent in the utilization of van and car
pool programs in SIP's for the achievement of air quality standards is
the issue of enforcement. The employer and his employees are not
legally bound to participate in the programs. Thus, the EPA or appli-
cable state agencies could not take action against them for noncompli-
ance, and since they are not actually polluters, there is no possibility
of a private suit for violation of the Clean Air Act. 104 In United States
v. Ohio Department of Highway Safety, 0 5 however, the court deter-
mined that the EPA could undertake enforcement measures against a
state as if it were an individual in situations where the state fails to
prevent use of its streets and highways by vehicles that pollute.10 6  By
analogy, an employer might be held liable for having an excessive
number of polluting vehicles on his premises. Thus, the only viable
alternative for the employer and his employees in areas lacking ade-
quate mass transit facilities would be to set up car and van pool
programs.
The utilization of a toll strategy for transportation control presents
practical difficulties which must by considered prior to implementa-
tion-under certain circumstances, tolls may aggravate rather than
101. Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1520 (1976). The Federal
Crop Insurance Corporation operates the program and is responsible for offering
coverage to appropriate agricultural industries. In Rainbow Valley Citrus Corp. v.
Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 506 F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1974), the defendant's decision
to refuse coverage to citrus growers was upheld, since the decision was based on an
evaluation of coverage risks.
102. National Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1976). The govern-
ment take-over of the flood insurance program was upheld in National Flood Ins.
Ass'n v. Harris, 444 F.Supp. 969, 972 (D.C.C. 1977).
103. National Insurance Development Program, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1749 bbb 1-21
(1976). The purpose of federal riot reinsurance is to preclude further deterioration of
inner city areas due to lack of adequate insurance coverage. Since it may be uneco-
nomical for private insurers to provide proper coverage in such areas the government
reinsures their losses. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. HUD, 478 F. Supp. 135, 136
(D.C.C. 1979) (the federal party erred in cancelling the plaintiff's riot reinsurance
because of its state's failure to comply with certain regulations).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 7604. See note 15 supra for a discussion of the citizen suit
provision of the Act.
105. 635 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949 (1981).
106. This case involved the issue as to whether the EPA can directly proceed
against a state to require enforcement of an EPA-promulgated vehicle inspection and
maintenance program. The court found that the EPA could proceed against the state
as if it were a person who failed to comply with an EPA directive. The court noted
that the state has an affirmative duty to prevent polluting vehicles from using its
facilities (highways). Id. at 1205.
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alleviate the air pollution problem. For example, one of the reasons
for the opposition to tolls on New York's East River bridges was the
belief that a massive air pollution situation would result at toll plazas
because of inadequate vehicle entrance facilities to the toll areas. It is
argued that long lines of cars at toll plazas would generate enough air
pollution to offset any benefits achieved by reducing the number of
vehicles entering Manhattan. 107
V. Conclusion
The wide variety of transportation control strategies available
merely emphasizes the limited scope of both the New York and Texas
Transportation Control Plans. New York continues to focus on mass
transit, although the results have been negligible, 108 and Texas relies
almost exclusively on van and car pool programs, whose pollution
reduction effectiveness has been questioned.' 0 Each state should
adopt a more extensive mix of TCP strategies, including, for example,
107. Telephone interview with Victor Ross, Executive Assistant to the Traffic
Commissioner, New York Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Opera-
tions (Jan. 25, 1982). The principal cause of the anticipated pollution problem in the
case of East River Bridge tolls would be the inadequate automobile entrance facilities
on the Queens side of the river-where the toll plazas would have been located. The
result of imposing the toll strategy on these bridges would, therefore, be to move the
pollution from Manhattan to Long Island City, Queens. Mr. Ross indicated that a
recent experiment conducted by the Department of Transportation verifies the accu-
racy of these predictions. The experiment involved routing most of the tunnel lanes
between Queens and Manhattan toward Manhattan in the morning and toward
Queens during the afternoon rush hour. The result was two to three mile long lines of
automobiles waiting to enter the toll plaza, located on the Queens side. Mr. Ross also
noted that if toll plaza pollution levels were far in excess of acceptable limits, the
possibility existed that citizens' groups could have sought a court order to close the
bridges until the tolls were eliminated. Thus, the utilization of a toll strategy to
combat air pollution in such a situation could result in an aggravation of the problem
it was meant to solve. Id.
108. A study by Daniel E. Chall indicated that the New York subway system is in
a state of "notorious deterioration." Bus. WK., May 11, 1981, at 18. This sentiment
was echoed in a New York Times article, which noted that "[d]elayed subway trips,
commuter-train breakdowns and no-show buses" were threatening to severely injure
New York's reputation as a good place to do business. N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1981, § 1,
at 1, col. 1. The Chall study found that during 1980 subway use fell by 2% and auto
traffic in Manhattan rose by 3%. The effect of this increased traffic volume on
average midtown automobile speeds was that average speeds fell 26%. Bus. WK.,
May 11, 1981, at 18.
109. See note 54 supra for a discussion of the expected air pollution benefits
resulting from expansion of the van and car pool programs. The percentages of
reduction for hydrocarbon pollution by 1987 are fairly small compared to the magni-
tude of the problem.
748 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. X
the increased utilization of a compressed work week."10 Financial
incentives also should be provided by the government to employers
who initiate such programs, the cost of which would be offset by
reduction in monies spent on enforcement of less productive transpor-
tation control measures. Innovative and thoughtful planning is
needed to deal with the pollution problem-one which threatens the
quality of life and health in metropolitan areas.
Ellen Hershkowitz
110. See note 39 supra. In Denver, a compressed work week resulted in a 16%
decrease in automobile travel. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 28, 1981, at 77.
